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I. INTRODUCTION
Challenges to public sector employment relations have emerged in over a
dozen states with surprising intensity. These challenges have re-opened what
were considered long-resolved debates and raised questions about
fundamental underlying principles in employment relations. At stake is the
capacity of government to deliver services efficiently and effectively to
citizens, the dignity and rights of pubic workers, and the institutional
arrangements designed to provide structure and balance to employment
relations. There is a need for innovation and transformation in public sector
employment relations, connecting the work people do with "public goods."
However, the current direction of public debate is pointing instead toward
parochial power moves, with the risk of gridlock or escalating conflict.
In this policy framing paper, we argue that there are two core functions
for any institutional arrangement-mitigating harm and creating value. We
assess the dynamics of public sector employment relations along both
dimensions. Then, focusing on school reform in education, we provide
detailed evidence of what can be termed "islands of success," where further
diffusion and overall transformation is possible, but at risk in the current
climate. We conclude with a vision for public sector employment relations
(with implications for the private sector as well) that is centered on high
performance work systems that take into account public goods.
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES
The challenges to public sector collective bargaining call for a return to
what are sometimes referred to as "first principles." These are the basic
underlying assumptions and points of departure in any debate or theory
construction.' In order to join debates on public sector collective bargaining,
as well as to realize the full potential for innovation and transformation in
public sector collective bargaining, it is important to begin with a review of
these first principles. We highlight three principles, which are the underlying
1 In mathematics and philosophy, first principles represent axioms or foundational
assumptions on which theory builds. The mathematician Godel notably argued that all
mathematical proofs must rest on additional assumptions or postulates-they cannot be
fully self-contained. See FROM FREGE TO GODEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN MATHEMATICAL
LOGIC, 1979-1931 (Jean van Heijenoort ed., 3d ed. 1967).
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rights on which public sector collective bargaining rests, the underlying
nature of the work in the public sector, and the functioning of labor markets.
In each case, these first principles embody a form of "check and balance"
that is a further point of departure for any consideration of public sector
collective bargaining.
A. Constitutional Versus Property Rights
Collective bargaining established itself first as a societal institution in the
private sector. In that context, the rights accorded to employees to join
together for collective action were carved out of an employer's property
rights in the business enterprise.2 The underlying motivation centered on
increasing consumer purchasing power, providing a check and balance
between labor and management in society, and promoting orderly
mechanisms for resolving conflict.3
In the public sector, the legal foundations for collective bargaining do not
derive from property rights, but rather from federal and state constitutional
guarantees of free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to redress
grievances. As a result, a first principle in public sector collective bargaining
is that it rests on constitutional rights, rather than property rights. This was
clearly evident in the first major debate in the scholarly literature on public
sector collective bargaining, where Wellington and Winter, on the one hand,
argued that public sector collective bargaining privileged unions over other
actors in society,4 and Clyde Summers, on the other hand, argued that public
sector collective bargaining unions needed the venue of collective bargaining
so that employee voice would not be trampled by other actors and other
interests.5 The current challenges to public sector collective bargaining have
revived this classic debate, and we will argue, the potential for innovation
and transformation in public sector labor-management relations represents an
important synthesis.
2 HARRY C. KATZ & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1992).
3 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1936).
4 See Harry H. Wellington & Ralph K. Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining
in Public Employment, 78 YALE L. J., 1107, 1107-27 (1969).
5 See Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L. J. 1156, 1159-61 (1974). In personal correspondence Marty Malin also notes
that Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Emp., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979), and
Minnesota State Bd. of Cmty. Coll. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), can be read together
as indicating that the Supreme Court is staying out of the debate, leaving resolution up to
state law.
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In addition to property rights and constitutional rights, there is one more
set of legal underpinnings for collective bargaining, which are basic human
rights. The United Nations (UN) connected working conditions and
collective bargaining to basic human rights by stating in Article 23 of the
UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
* Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just
and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
* Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for
equal work.
* Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration
ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity,
and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
* Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests. 6
In 1998 the International Labor Organization (ILO) further elaborated on
these basic rights in its Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work.7 While there are many factors that are associated with the push-back
in Wisconsin and Ohio after collective bargaining rights were limited or
eliminated, it is possible that part of , the push-back was perceived
overreaching that took away what are seen as basic human rights.8 These
underlying rights are part of a fundamental check and balance between
employer and employee rights in society-centered on property rights in the
private sector and constitutional rights in the public sector. There will
always be tensions between competing rights, at issue is the degree to which
these tensions are resolved in constructive or less constructive ways. As
Michael Piore points out, these rights only have force when connected to
supporting institutional arrangements. 9 By expanding the focus of collective
6 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.
7 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, ILO (1998),
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm.
8 See, e.g., Monica Davey & A.G. Sulzberger, In Wisconsin Battle on Unions, State
Democrats See a Gift, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2011, at Al.
9 See Michael Piore, Whither Industrial Relations: Does It Have a Future in a Post-
Industrial Society?, 49 BlT. J. INDUS. REL. 792, 793 (2011).
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bargaining in the public sector to better take into account public goods, we
hope to foster just these kinds of connections.
B. Professional Work
Beyond the foundational rights on which public sector collective
bargaining rests, another first principle centers on the work itself.
Historically, the institutions of collective bargaining have reflected the nature
of the work, beginning with craft unions and extending to industrial unions.10
John R. Commons first connected the changing institutional arrangements
with the changing structure of the markets for goods and services.I More
recently, various scholars have argued that the rise of an information or
knowledge economy points toward an institutional form that is more of a
professional association than either a craft or an industrial union, 12 a union
that derives power more by enabling work than by threatening to withhold
labor,' 3 and unions as a value-add network.14
In the public sector there are jobs that fit older craft models (such as the
work of machine repair technicians, construction trades, road crews, etc.), but
very few that resemble industrial models (license plate production in prisons
is an example, though it is a special case). For the most part, however, the
work in the public sector is service work and the work of professionals who
must demonstrate specialized expertise in order to be hired (teachers, police,
firefighters, child protection workers, forestry workers, environmental
scientists, city and regional planners, building and highway inspectors, public
defenders, judges, etc.). Thus, it is not a surprise to find that there has been
debate over whether the institutional nature of the unions representing these
workers is closer to that of a professional association or a trade union. 15 Also
note that these "good" jobs in the public sector have provided women and
minority workers with greater opportunities than the private sector-progress
that is at risk with attacks on public sector workers.
10 Katz & Kochan, supra note 2, at 19-55.
1 See JOHN COMMONS ET AL., HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 1-5 (John
Commons ed., 1935).
1 2 CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE
CHANGING CORPORATION 10-12 (2nd ed. 1996).
13 JOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., KNOWLEDGE-DRIVEN WORK: UNEXPECTED
LESSONS FROM JAPANESE AND UNITED STATES WORK PRACTICES (1988).
14 Saul A. Rubinstein, Unions as Value-Adding Networks: Possibilities for the
Future of US. Unionism, 22 J. LAB. RES. 581, 582-587 (2001).
15 Note that many of today's public employee labor unions began as professional
associations and fraternal organizations.
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The nature of the work is a key factor as we consider the potential for
innovation and transformation, since the models have to be appropriate for
work that involves service delivery and that draws on various forms of
professional expertise. The nature of the work is also relevant in the context
of attacks on public sector collective bargaining that have, in the process,
disparaged public sector workers and implicitly treated them as expendable.
The primary role of state and local government is as a service provider (with
relatively few income transfers), which means that its primary role is as an
employer of service workers.16 In the private sector, IBM has embraced
service work and established advancing "service science" as a strategic
priority.' 7 We should expect no less of the public sector. Specifically, we
will argue with respect to the next first principle that there are forms of job-
specific expertise in which below-market pay and benefits will result in high
turnover and have consequences for the quality of service delivery and the
conduct of expert work. "Professional standards" represent a form of check
and balance on management decisions that would compromise quality of
services in the public sector and they also represent a foundation for
advancing "public goods" through professionalism on the job.
C. Labor Supply and Demand
A final first principle concerns the nature of labor markets. In the private
sector we term labor as a "derived demand" in that there is a market demand
for goods and services from which the demand for labor is then derived. In
the public sector, there is not a market demand for goods and services in the
same way. Rather, under the constitutional authority granted to government
agencies, decisions are made about the scale and scope of the government
enterprise and then the demand for labor in the public sector is derived from
that. The public sector labor market is not independent from the private
sector since the supply of labor in many trades and professions can choose
between public and private sectors. As we will see, efforts to reduce pay and
benefits in the public sector can impair the ability of government agencies to
attract and retain the talent needed to operate the government enterprise.' 8 In
this sense, the labor market imposes a check and balance on policy makers-
even if they want to shift to more of a market model to reduce pay and
16 The Diane Rehm Show, NPR (May 1, 2011),
http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2011-01-05/state-budgets-and-public-
employees/transcript.
17 See John Teresko, IBM's Winning Strategy, INDUSTRYWEEK, Mar. 2009, at 18.
18 See Part III infra.
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benefits, the ability to attract needed talent represents a boundary condition.
Indeed, in the absence of collective bargaining, public employers may
exercise monopsony power, 19 which would drive compensation below an
efficient level for attracting, retaining, and motivating workers.
While there are additional institutional considerations that we introduce
in the next section, these three first principles are foundational for this paper.
That is, employment relations derived from constitutional rights (not
property rights), the work itself as primarily service work with a high
proportion of professional employees delivering the services, and the
dynamics of labor demand as distinct in the public sector, with labor supply
as a boundary condition for ensuring effective government operations. The
checks and balances associated with each of the first principles point to what
might be considered an additional first principle, which is the very concept of
checks and balances in civil society.
III. A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO INSTITUTIONS
The pace of change is accelerating in virtually every aspect of our post-
industrial society.20 As a result, all of our core institutions are challenged,
impacting the ways we address the full spectrum of societal priorities,
including food, water, housing, energy, health, transportation, education,
security, religion, the economy, information, justice, and more. In too many
cases there is polarization and gridlock or actions that are incomplete in fully
addressing societal needs. Recent research on infrastructure systems in
society has highlighted two fundamental functional requirements of systems-
level institutional arrangements-mitigating harm and creating value, both of
which have a long history in institutional scholarship. 21
First, institutional arrangements need to mitigate harm. This functional
requirement rests on the public goods literature. While substantial parts of
this literature are focused on what economists term externalities-market
failures for which government intervention or other actions are needed--our
focus is on the portion of this literature concerned with institutional
arrangements that distort or undermine the public interest. In this context,
for example, Olson has urged that incentives are needed for actors to advance
19 Where there is only one customer for a given good, that customer has monopson
power to insist on below market prices.
20 MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES SABLE, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE:
POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 258-308 (1984).
21 See generally Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Christopher Lawson, Valuing the
Commons: A Fundamental Challenge across Complex Systems, (2010) (MIT's
Engineering Sys. Div., Working Paper) (on file with author).
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the public interest in order to counteract a logic of collective action that
devolves to narrow self-interest.22 Relatedly, Michels has argued that there
is an inevitable tendency toward oligarchy where organizational self-
preservation will replace the original public good that they were established
to pursue.23  These tendencies risk what are termed "tragedies of the
commons" where individuals pursuing rational self-interest end up
destroying resources in ways that make everyone worse off. In private sector
collective bargaining, an example of mitigating harm can be found in the
post-World War II introduction of what was termed the "annual
improvement factor" in the auto industry-a formula that provided
approximately three percent annual wage increases (beyond cost-of-living
increases) based on what were approximately three percent productivity
growth. The importance of this formulation is that the wage increases did
not happen at the expense of the consumer (mitigating the risk of collusion
between labor and management). This risk was highlighted by George
Taylor, advisor to five U.S. Presidents on labor policy, when he stated:
The sound use of collective bargaining is dependent, however, upon union
and the managements' voluntarily giving reasonable weight to the broad
public interest. . . . A general "ganging up on the consumer" would be
incompatible with the development of collective bargaining as a socially
desirable institution.24
In the context of public sector collective bargaining, we will consider a
number of ways that collective bargaining can represent potential harm to the
public interest, as well as ways to mitigate such harm. The importance of
this dimension is illustrated, for example, in public sector legislation for
protective service workers such as police and firefighters, where various
forms of interest arbitration are substituted for the right to strike. Marty
Malin has argued that there is a fundamental paradox in public sector
collective bargaining since the scope of bargaining is narrowly focused on
wages, hours, and working conditions (rather than broader public goods), and
unions are then seen as anti-democratic since they act as a narrowly focused
22 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 126-127 (2d ed., 1971).
23 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (1949); see also Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
24 George W. Taylor, National Labor Policy, 274 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
Sci. 185, 188 (1951).
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interest group. 25 To resolve the paradox, he calls for a broadening of the
scope of bargaining and increased engagement of additional stakeholders in
the process. 26  It is in precisely that spirit that we turn to the second
functional aspect of an institution, which is to create value.
In addition to mitigating harm, institutional arrangements need to create
value. This functional requirement is bound by Abraham Lincoln's call for
government to only do for its citizens what they can't do for themselves. 27
Thus, creating value is not a license to pursue anything that looks like it
might improve society, but it does suggest that institutional arrangements can
and should foster innovation in ways that they are uniquely able to do.
Ostrom has documented how private cooperative institutional arrangements
have been formed initially to mitigate harm with respect to the use of natural
resources. 28  In the process, she identifies ways that these cooperative
arrangements create value by, in effect, "expanding the pie" with respect to
water resources and other public goods.29 It was in this spirit in the federal
sector, for example, that the 1993 National Performance Review Initiative
and the executive order promoting Federal Labor-Management
Partnerships 30 both engaged the front-line workforce and their union
25 See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox of Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L. J.
1369, 1370-74 (2009).
26 Id. at 1398.
27 The original text reads:
"The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever
they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or cannot so well do, for themselves, in
their separate and individual capacities. In all that the people can individually do as
well for themselves, government ought not to interfere. The desirable things which
the individuals of a people cannot do, or cannot well do, for themselves, fall into two
classes: those which have relation to wrongs, and those which have not. . . . The
first-that in relation to wrongs-embraces all crimes, misdemeanors and non-
performance of contracts. The other embraces all which, in its nature, and without
wrong, requires combined action, as public roads and highways, public schools,
charities, pauperism, orphanage, estates of the deceased, and the machinery of
government itself."
Fragment of speech on government, possibly July 1, 1854.
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/quotes.htm.
28 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
29 Id.
30 Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1994), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. §
7101 (later rescinded by President George Bush in Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761
(2002), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (Supp. 2001)).
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representatives in the redesign of work and operations to improve the
efficiency and delivery of services by the federal government.
Mitigating harm and creating value are not necessarily flip sides of the
same coin. It is possible to only mitigate harm without any new value being
created. The use of interest arbitration, for example, does mitigate the risk of
disruption of public service but is an imperfect substitute for a negotiated
agreement, and it doesn't necessarily better take into account the public
interest. Alternatively, it is possible to create value and create new forms of
harm as well. For example, some public organizations have experimented
with gainsharing and goal sharing programs that provided workers with
financial incentives to improve the efficiency of public services.31 Even
though some held that public servants shouldn't have access to such
incentives, early studies found that the gains to the public far outweighed the
costs.32 Thus, mitigating harm and creating value are conceptually distinct,
though closely related. Moreover, public sector collective bargaining has not
been sufficiently systematic in either case.
A. Historical Dynamics
Over forty years ago (by 1969), seventeen states had provided for a duty
to bargain or established a right to "meet and confer," as Tables 1 and 2
indicate. To a substantial degree, these early laws replicated the private
sector model with the exception for the ways in which they tried to address
the resolution of impasses in bargaining (for which there was great
experimentation in an effort to address this unique aspect of the public
sector).33 There was not, however, additional consideration of either other
forms of potential harm to the public interest (such as through narrow work
rules) or other ways to create value (such as through joint improvement
efforts). Twenty-eight years ago in 1984, these adapted versions of private
31 This occurred, for example, under the civil service waiver policy during the
Clinton Administration where Federal agencies could petition for a waiver from parts of
civil service regulations in order to experiment with human resource management
practices. This program was eliminated by President George W. Bush. See, e.g., The
U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Gainsharing Links Performance Management
Processes (Feb. 1995), http://www.opm.gov/performi/articles/033.asp.
3 2 JOHN M. GREINER ET AL., PRODUCTIVITY AND MOTIVATION: A REVIEW OF STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES (1981); DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR (1992).
33 SCOPE OF PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (Walter J. Gershenfeld et al. eds., 1977).
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sector laws were in place in forty-three states, and by 1995, the diffusion
went a bit further.
In the 1990s, however, there was some statutory erosion of public
employee bargaining rights that can now be seen as a precursor of the current
challenges. 34 Oregon eliminated bargaining on certain subjects, for example,
such as class size; Michigan prohibited bargaining on a number of subjects in
public education and imposed severe penalties for illegal strikes; Wisconsin
adopted the "Qualified Economic Offer" which essentially preempted
bargaining over salaries in public education; New Mexico's public employee
statute sunset when a Republican governor vetoed legislation that would
have renewed it; Illinois enacted the Chicago School Reform Act which
prohibited decision and impact bargaining over numerous subjects and
temporarily prohibited strikes in Chicago Public School and City College of
Chicago; Pennsylvania enacted legislation that would prohibit bargaining in
the event of financial emergency in the Philadelphia public schools.
In the first decade of the 2000s there was again an expansion of rights.
Malin characterizes this as a reverse swing of the pendulum, including the
repeal of the QEO policy in Wisconsin, as well as the extension of
bargaining rights to state university faculty and research assistants. 35
Importantly, two issues that sit at the intersection of teacher working
conditions and the public interest-teacher preparation time and teacher
evaluation plans-became mandatory subjects of bargaining during this
decade. 36 A controversial issue in the private sector-card check recognition
for new union organizing-was granted for public sector union organizing in
Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, New Hampshire, California, and
Massachusetts. 37  Additionally, a number of states extended collective
bargaining rights to employees typically considered to be independent
contractors-home health care aides and in-home daycare providers. 38 In a
2007 Missouri Supreme Court decision, all employees, not just private sector
34 We thank Marty Malin for many of the following notes on statutory erosion.
35 Martin H. Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law: A Search
for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. EMP. L. 149, 151 (2012).
36 Id.
37 Robert Bruno et al., Majority Authorizations and Union Organizing in the Public
Sector: A Four-State Perspective, (May 14, 2009), http://www.ler.illinois.edullabor
/images/Multi-State%20EFCA%20Report.pdf.
38 Janice Podsada, Home Care Workers Form First CT Union Under SEIU,
HARTFoRD CouRAr (March 29, 2012), available at http://articles.courant.com/2012-03-
29/business/hc-home-care-union-formed-20120329 1 home-health-care-aides-care-
providers-deborah-chemoff.
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workers, were held to have the right to bargain collectively.39 Also, New
Mexico enacted a public employee collective bargaining statute that was
stronger than the one which had sunset four years earlier.40
Note as well that there is bargaining taking place over the past two
decades even where there is no authority to negotiate.41 For example, there
have been Tennessee Appellate Court decisions and Tennessee Attorney
General opinions to the effect that unless expressly authorized by statute,
local governments lack authority to engage in collective bargaining.42
Nevertheless, Memphis and Nashville do bargain, they do have collective
bargaining agreements, and the parties do arbitrate grievances, even though
none of it is legally enforceable. The situation is similar in Salt Lake City
and other Utah municipalities where bargaining does take place even in the
absence of a supporting state law.
Thus, during this concluding quarter of the last century and the first
decade of this century, the trend has been heavily toward expanded rights for
public sector workers, with firefighters or teachers often achieving these
rights in advance of others. At the same time, there has been some erosion,
particularly in areas where public goods were at stake, such as class size, and
in order to reduce the impact of public unions on public resources. In this
context the challenges to public sector collective bargaining rights during the
past two years in at least fourteen states can be understood as part of a larger
historic debate in which the core tension between worker rights to bargain
collectively have been in tension with public goods that are seen as being at
risk due to work rules and financial agreements.
While the diffusion of public sector enabling legislation has been far
more limited in "right-to-work" states (Table 2) than what can be termed
"right-to-representation" states (Table 1), the challenges have been in both
groups of states-revealing vulnerability of the institution to attacks that it
was generating harm. The initial quarter century of growth in public sector
unionism was faster than the private sector. The recent challenges have
happened at an even faster pace. Over 550 bills were introduced in state
legislatures challenging aspects of public sector collective bargaining, with
changes in thirteen states: Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, Arizona, Idaho,
Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee,
39 Independence-NEA v. Independence Sch. Dist., 223 S.W. 3d 131, 139 (Mo.
2007).
40 Malin, supra note 35, at 152.
41 We also thank Marty Malin for his observations on bargaining in the absence of
legislative support.
42 See Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 95-036 (Apr. 16, 1995); No. 79-172 (Apr. 10,
1979); No. 78-437 (Dec. 28, 1978); and No. 77-362 (Oct. 21, 1977).
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Utah, and Wyoming.43 The changes in Ohio were subsequently reversed and
debates continue in many of these and other states.44 The current dynamic
poses a question-can public sector labor relations sufficiently transform
itself as an institution such that labor and management are again leading
employment relations in this sector?
[See Tables 1 and 2]
In order to examine the potential for transformation in the public sector,
it will be helpful to import a framework from research on private sector
industrial relations. In 1986, Kochan, Katz, and McKersie documented the
decline of what was termed the "New Deal" industrial relations model and
the ascendency of the non-union (management-led) human resource
management model in setting the tone on employment relations in the United
States.45 They argued that the unionized sector (labor and management
together) would only be able to re-establish leadership through fundamental
changes at three levels of interaction-the workplace level, the collective
bargaining level, and the strategic level. 46 Combined together, innovation at
all three levels would enable a transformation in U.S. industrial relations. In
this paper, we will present evidence to suggest that an equally extensive
range of innovations-both mitigating harm and creating value-bringing
societal interests into play at all three levels will be needed for a
transformation in public sector employment relations.
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the way the three-tier
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie model can be embedded in the societal level.
The three tiers are all interdependent, as the arrows indicate. The three
additional arrows on the right and left signal that initiatives designed to
mitigate harm and create value are relevant at all three levels. These will
require fundamental changes to the institution if they are to be fully integral
to the operations.
43 David Schaper, Collective Bargaining Curbs Spread Across The U.S., NPR (May
24, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/05/24/136610879/collective-bargaining-curbs-
spread-across-the-u-s.
44 Sabrina Tavemise, Ohio Turns Back a Law Limiting Unions' Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2011, at Al.
4 5 THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS (1986).
46 Id.
119
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Figure 1: Three-Tier Transformation Model with Additional Societal
Level
Societal Level
(Mitigate Harm & Create Value)
Strate ic Level
Collective Bargaining Leve
Workplace Level
Note that the interplay of forcing and fostering47 between labor and
management still takes place within the three-tier model (the center arrows)
in Figure 1. This remains the dominant focus of labor-management
interactions. The societal considerations are connected both as a check and
balance (the three outside arrows on the left) on the parties and as the result
of innovations and public accountability by the parties (the three outside
arrows on the right) where they are giving "reasonable weight" to the public
interest.
B. Focus on Mitigating Harm
The original passage of public sector labor legislation was motivated by
high profile strikes that disrupted public services. As such, the first
consideration in mitigating harm is at the middle "collective bargaining
level" of the Kochan, Katz, and McKersie framework.48  As was noted
earlier, public sector labor legislation for protective service workers (police,
fire, and others), typically features binding interest arbitration and a
prohibition on strikes for this reason. Thus, one functional requirement for
institutional arrangements in public sector employment relations is to
mitigate escalating "collective bargaining level" conflicts over wages, hours,
and working conditions that disrupt public services through strikes or
lockouts. In fact, the evidence of numerous studies in the 1970s and 1980s
does suggest that the consequences of public sector strikes were far less
47 See generally RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL., STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS: A THEORY
OF CHANGE IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1994).
48 KOCHAN, supra note 45, at 16.
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damaging to the public interest than was initially feared. 49 Indeed, Malin's
1993 study found that when Illinois and Ohio legalized public employee
strikes, strike incident actually decreased.50
A second potential harm at the collective bargaining level are specific
wage and benefit provisions that are perceived as "overpaying" public sector
workers relative to their private sector counterparts. Many of the recent
efforts to reduce or eliminate public sector collective bargaining rights have
emerged in the context of a budget crisis following the deepest recession
since the great depression of the 1930s. In this regard, there have been
claims of higher than average wages in the public sector, overly generous
pensions, and overly extensive health care coverage. 51 In fact, as was noted
under first principles,52 public sector work has a higher proportion of
professional employees in comparison to the private sector and, as a result,
any comparison of wages and benefits has to take into account higher
education levels (with commensurate higher returns to education). Jeff
Keefe conducted this comparison, holding constant for education, and found
that public sector workers earned, on average, seven percent less than equally
educated private sector workers. 53 When taking into account pensions, the
gap was partly closed, with public sector workings receiving approximately
four percent lower wages and benefits than equally educated private sector
workers. 54 Similarly, Craig Olson has examined teacher pay and benefits for
all teachers in Illinois and Wisconsin over more than a decade.55 He has
found that close to or all of the increases in health care costs have been
absorbed by the teachers in either higher co-payments or lower than average
49 John F. Burton & Charles Krider, The Role and Consequences of Strikes by
Public Employees, 79 YALE L. J. 418, 440 (1970); David Lewin, Public Employment
Relations: Confronting the Issues, 12 INDUS. REL. 309, 310 (1973).
50 Martin H. Malin, Public Employees Right to Strike: Law and Experience, 26
MICH. L. REV. 313, 361 (1993).
51 Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Overpaid Public Workers: The Evidence
Mounts, WALL ST. J., (April 11, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052702304724404577295502528869614.html.
52 See infra Part II.
53 DAVID LEWIN ET AL., EMP'T POLICY RES. NETWORK & LAB. AND EMP'T
RELATIONS Ass'N, Getting it Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications from
Research on Public Sector Unionism and Collective Bargaining 4 (2011),
http://www.employmentpolicy.org/topic/402/research/getting-it-right.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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wage increases. 56 Still, ensuring that public sector workers are not overpaid
relative to comparable private sector workers is an important consideration.
There is a reciprocal concern with respect to pay and benefits for public
sector workers, which is that they not be underpaid. In Montana, for
example, the backlash against public sector collective bargaining has taken
the form of the Legislature overriding the Governor and voting down a 2011
pay bill in support of a newly negotiated four-year collective bargaining
agreement for state employees.57 As a result, there will not be any pay
increase for Montana state employees for the following four years. 58 Given
that over a third of the workforce will be eligible to retire in the next four
years, state officials are now concerned that the workforce will be underpaid
and they will not be able to attract the best talent for the next generation
workforce.
At the "workplace level," a key harm that has figured prominently in
efforts to eliminate or weaken collective bargaining provisions has been the
claim that poorly performing employees are protected by union collective
bargaining agreements. This argument has primarily been leveled against
teacher unions.59 It is important to recognize that there is a public good
here-high quality education-and it is certainly the case that high
performing teachers have a positive impact.60 The issue is in the tension
with respect to work rules that provide for due process in the discipline or
discharge of underperforming workers. In the early public sector literature
this issues was joined via scholarship on the scope of collective bargaining.
As Gershenfeld notes:
The scope-of-bargaining issue is important because it goes to the heart of
the collective-bargaining relationship. The public employer is
understandably uneasy when he believes that union demands affect the core
of the agency mission. Employees and their organizations are equally
distressed when they believe legislation, executive orders, and/or employers
56 Id. at 6.
57 Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld & Joel Schaefer, Montana Labor-Management Summit
(June 2011).
58 Id.
59 For example, the discussions surrounding the documentary WAITING FOR
SUPERMAN (Participant Media 2010), http://www.waitingforsuperman.com/action/.
60 Raj Chetty et al., Great Teaching: Measuring its Effects on Students' Future
Earnings, EDUCATION NEXT (Summer 2012).
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unreasonably seek to limit their legitimate concerns involving income and
security. 61
As we will illustrate with data on innovation in public education, there
are illustrative teacher unions and public employers who are partly resolving
this tension by expanding the scope of bargaining to include joint workplace-
level initiatives aimed at advancing the public mission.62 Still, there is a key
question as to whether these efforts are sufficiently robust to ensure the
public that the public goods associated with education or the public goods in
other areas of the public sector are sufficiently protected.
An opposite harm at the "workplace level" involves what might be called
the collateral damage from attacks on public sector collective bargaining
rights. Many of these attacks directly or indirectly imply that public sector
workers are ineffective (and overly protected), overpaid (and wasting tax
dollars), and self-centered (not taking into account the public interest). In
fact, many people choose to work in the public sector out of a sense of
mission or public service, not pursuing private sector careers that might be
more lucrative. As well, there is a measure of professional pride that imbues
the work of many public sector employees. To the extent that public sector
workers feel that they are being diminished, disrespected, or even demonized
by the attacks on public sector collective bargaining, then there is harm as
reflected in the quality of service delivery, the costs of higher turnover, and a
reduced ability to recruit new talent.
At the strategic level, the original debates between Wellington and
Winter and Summers 63 centered on a question as to whether there was harm
to the public by unions having privileged influence over the allocation of
public resources. The first wave of public sector scholarship in the 1970s
and 1980s examined these issues closely and concluded that the potential for
influence was tempered by many factors, including: legislation limiting tax
increases, the structure of local governments, and more.64
Interestingly, there is also a counter argument that can be made at the
"strategic level," which is that the Supreme Court decision in the Citizens
United case,65 has incentivized parts of the Republican Party to challenge the
legitimacy of unions as a means to weakening the Democratic Party. This
61 Gershenfeld et al., supra note 33, at 1.
62 See infra Part X.
63 Wellington & Winter, supra note 4, at 1107-27; Summers, supra note 5, at 1159-
61.
64 Thomas A. Kochan, A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City
Governments, 27 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 525, 525-42 (1973).
65 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
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has less to do with a rejection of collective bargaining and more to do with
gaining political advantage at the expense of collective bargaining. This too
is a form of harm that should be mitigated.
To summarize, mitigating harm in public sector labor relations involves
at least the following:
Mitigating Harm at the Strategic Level
* Public sector unions having too great an ability to influence public
officials on the allocation of public resources
* Public sector officials having too great an ability to undercut public
sector unions for political gain separate from employment relations
Mitigating Harm at the Collective Bargaining Level
* Minimizing or eliminating disruptions to public services due to
strikes or lockouts
* Specific contractual provisions on wages and benefits that result in
public sector workers being over paid or underpaid relative to private sector
workers
Mitigating Harm at the Workplace Level
* Work rules and labor-management practices that diminish public
goods
* Attacks on public sector unions that erode dignity and respect for
public employees
Transformation of employment relations will require attending to the
linkages across levels when it comes to mitigating harm. Indeed, where the
challenges to public sector collective bargaining have been successful, it has
been because the challenge has been at all three levels--challenging the way
work rules diminish public goods (such as by protecting poor performing
employees), challenging the results of collective bargaining as excessive, and
challenging the very existence of unions as having too much influence over
public officials.
Any restructuring and innovation in public sector collective bargaining
has to explicitly address these potential forms of harm at all three levels.
What are ways to assure the public that parties are not pursuing self-interest
in ways that create potential harm for the public? Without tangible answers
to this question, the institution is vulnerable to attacks. To fully understand
and address this vulnerability, it is important to consider also the capacity to
create value.
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C. Focus on Creating Value
The literatures on labor-management cooperation in the public and
private sectors are almost entirely focused on creating value. While there has
been some legislative support for labor-management cooperation or
partnership in both public and private sectors, the majority of innovation has
occurred without the benefit of policy initiatives that might confer additional
legitimacy, support for demonstration projects, resources for training, access
to expertise, and facilitated sharing of leading practices-all the things that
can accompany policy support.66
In the public sector (as in the private sector), the collective bargaining
level has primarily served as the platform for the launch of labor-
management committees and joint initiatives that address workplace level
operations. 67 Also at the collective bargaining level in the public sector,
there have been joint initiatives on containing health care costs and
introducing performance-based pay programs. 68 For example, under the
1993 National Performance Review Initiatives, some government
installations received waivers from Civil Service Provisions to introduce gain
sharing and goal sharing programs that incentivized performance
improvements (cost savings, quality improvements, etc.). 69
At the workplace level, joint efforts have addressed improvements in
operational efficiency, implementation of continuous quality improvement
programs, establishment of service delivery teams, identification of cost
saving opportunities, improvements in workplace health and safety, and
related initiatives. 70 A 1996 U.S. Department of Labor study of fifty public
sector workplaces found that labor-management cooperation and employee
66 Labor-Management Relations Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197. This Act is illustrative
of the policy intent and the practical reality-the act articulates the creation of value as
the goal, yet the act has never been fully funded and the rules governing its
administration limit its focus to short-term demonstration projects.
6 7 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TASK FORCE, WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC
SERVICE: REPORT OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION 3-4,
13-23,49-51(1996).
68 Id.
6 9 AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS
BETTER AND COSTS LESS 34 (1993).
7 0 DAVID LEWIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR RELATIONS: ANALYSIS AND
READINGS 1113-21 (3d ed. 1988).
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participation led to dramatic improvements in quality, costs, and delivery of
service.71
At the strategic level in the public sector, value is created in advancing
"public goods" that go well beyond wages, hours, and working conditions.
This is reflected, for example, in teachers joining with administrators to
jointly improve educational outcomes, police and firefighters reaching
agreements to jointly improve public safety, natural resources employees
jointly improving environmental stewardship, and other similar joint
initiatives. Consider the following illustrative contract language from Article
24 of the San Juan Unified School District in California:
The District and the Association agree to take responsibility and be
held accountable for the improvement of the quality of teaching and
learning which represents an expanded role in public education. It is in the
best interest of the San Juan Schools that the District and the Association
cooperatively engage in activities and communication which demonstrate
mutual respect for all stakeholders and results in the improvement of
student achievement through development of common goals, a cooperative,
trusting environment and teamwork. It is the [parties'] belief that actively
and constructively involving all relevant stakeholders contributes
significantly toward achieving these goals.
Shared responsibility and accountability for results are at the core of a
continuous improvement model. Joint responsibility for student success
means that educators share in celebrating what works and share in
identifying together areas that are not working and are in need of
improvement. 72
This sort of language is designed to create value at the level of the
overall strategy for the educational enterprise. Unlike the strategic level in
the private sector where the alignment is usually around business strategy (or
mitigating externalities such as environmental impacts), the focus at this
level in the public sector is on advancing public goods. This is an interesting
counterpoint to the Wellington and Winter argument-where unions and
their members are reflecting a genuine interest in and commitment to public
service. 73
To summarize, creating value in public sector labor relations involves at
least the following:
71 DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TASK FORCE, supra note 67.
72 San Juan Unified School District & San Juan Teachers Association, Collective
Bargaining Contract 83 (2012).
73 See generally Wellington & Winter, supra note 4.
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Strategic Level
* Joint agreements and initiatives aimed at advancing "public goods"
Collective Bargaining Level
* Incentives to attract, develop, motivate, and retain the best quality
workforce
* Mechanisms to contain benefit cost
Workplace Level
* Fostering continuous improvement in operations
* Valuing the work itself
As was the case with mitigating harm, transformation requires some
degree of alignment across levels. For example, in the early 1990s the State
Department of Natural Resources in Michigan launched a Continuous
Quality Improvement (CQI) initiative at the workplace level.74 This required
enabling support at the collective bargaining level. Then, as service delivery
teams were formed in various regions (combining the monitoring of air
quality, water quality, etc.), a proposal emerged to restructure the agency
operations around natural watersheds rather than county boundaries. This
ultimately led to a split in the agency-with the administration of parks and
recreation retaining the county-based structure and the new Department of
Environmental Quality incorporating some of the team-based and watershed-
based ideas. In this process, both labor and management were engaged in
processes aimed at creating value at all three levels-workplace, collective
bargaining, and strategic-though the spilt was an unexpected outcome.75
In the absence of unions and collective bargaining, the potential labor-
management mechanisms for creating value and mitigating harm at all three
levels would be absent. While there would be less risk of strikes and
lockouts, that doesn't mean that there would be no risk of collective action
by employees. Moreover, without collective bargaining, there would have to
be some comparable forum within which employee interests could be
balanced with other relevant interests. Not only is there a risk, as Clyde
Summers argued, of employee interests being trampled by other interestS76
(which is not in the public interest when it comes to the delivery of services
and the assurance of basic human rights), but there is the risk of incomplete
7 4 CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD ET AL., WORKER TRAINING IN MICHIGAN: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PUBLIC POLICY, POLICY CHOICES: FRAMING THE DEBATE FOR MICHIGAN'S FUTURE,
FACULTY OF INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH (1994).
75 JOEL CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD & KEVIN FORD, VALUABLE DISCONNECTS IN
ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING SYSTEMS: INTEGRATING BOLD VISIONS AND HARSH
REALITIES (2005).
76 Summers, supra note 5, at 1159-61.
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advancing of employee professionalism, pride in craft, and commitment to
public service. To fully appreciate what is possible with unions and
collective bargaining, we will focus on the specific case of union-
management collaboration on school reform.
IV. COLLABORATIVE SCHOOL REFORM
For more than a decade the debate on improving U.S. public schools has
focused on teacher quality. Policy directives from Washington and from
state houses across the country have pushed the expanded use of classroom
and performance standards, merit pay, and teacher evaluation based on high
stakes testing of students. These policies have come from both Republicans
(No Child Left Behind) 77 and Democrats (Race to the Top).78 In addition,
both have promoted market-based reforms including the widespread use of
charter schools and privatization. Yet, there is little research that shows
these reforms to be effective. In fact, a pivotal study on charter schools
shows them to be no better than regular public schools.79
Despite the lack of evidence on the efficacy of market-based solutions,
public policy initiatives have continued to focus on individual teacher
quality. Further, there has been little systematic research on innovation and
reform that has been created locally from within school districts rather than
imposed from above. Research co-led by one of the co-authors of this paper
attempts to fill that gap and analyze reform efforts that are already in public
school districts across the country.80 This study examines collaborative
efforts by teachers, their unions, and administrators to reform public
education through locally developed innovations that improve schools, both
teaching quality and student achievement.8 ' The research was
conceptualized around understanding how local teachers' unions add value to
educational quality through their influence on teaching and student
performance. 82 As we will see, it also plays a role in mitigating harm to
parties not at the bargaining table. The broad aim is to the shift the debate on
77 No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6578 (2001).
78 Race to the Top (RTT) Act of 2011, S. 844, 112th Congress (2011).
7 9 See generally CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES, STANFORD
UNIVERSITY, MULTIPLE CHOICE: CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN SIXTEEN STATES
(2011).
80 Saul A. Rubinstein & John E. McCarthy, Public School Reform through Union-
Management Collaboration, 20 ADVANCES INDUS. & LAB. REL. 19 (forthcoming 2012).
81 Id.
82 Id.
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school reform from ideology to proven innovation that is already working, to
share the elements common to sustained collaboration around school
improvement, to understand how local unions add value to school
performance, and to identify ways that such efforts mitigate actual or
perceived harm for the public.
This research now includes seven cases of collaborative partnerships
between teachers, local unions and administrators that have all been
sustained for fifteen years or more. The districts-ABC Unified School
District, Cerritos, California; Toledo, Ohio; Hillsborough, Florida;
Plattsburgh, New York; Norfolk, Virginia; St. Francis, Minnesota; Charlotte
County, Florida-come from across the country-north and south, east and
west. They come from right-to-work states and those with stronger
collective bargaining representation rights. They are urban and rural, large
and small. These districts also have a significant proportion of students on
free or reduced-price lunch. The research team visited all seven districts and
conducted interviews that included union presidents, current and former
superintendents, central office administrators, principals, union
representatives and executive board members, teachers, support staff, board
members, and members of the business community. In addition, archival data
was reviewed, including contracts, memoranda of understanding, student
performance data, and internal reports. The full presentation of the research
is forthcoming by Rubinstein and McCarthy.83 Preliminary findings are
summarized here to inform this framework.
A. Long Term Collaborative Partnerships-Common Patterns
1. Crisis as Motivation to Collaborate
In most of these districts a strike or a vote to strike was the critical event
that sparked both the local union and the administration to seek an alternative
direction in their union-management relations. They recognized that their
adversarial relationships were not in the best interests of teachers, students,
or administrators. 84 Collaborative approaches to school improvement were
seen as a more productive alternative. There is an extensive literature
documenting various aspects of what Lewin termed the "unfreezing" of
social relations85 and what Richard Walton termed a "golden middle" where
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Kurt Lewin, Defining the 'Field at a Given Time', 50 PSYCHOL. REV. 292,
292-310 (1943).
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there is sufficient crisis to unfreeze existing relations, but not so much of a
crisis as to undermine the capacity for innovation.86 Actual or potential harm
to the public were all part of this unfreezing process.
Why don't parties just choose to collaborate from the outset? Sometimes
union-management relationships are collaborative from the outset, but even
these relationships always have to address a mix of integrative and
distributive issues87 and there are many ways that relations can deteriorate
and become centered on distributive conflicts. As we will see below, a
fundamental policy challenge is to facilitate collaboration without having to
depend on a severe, unfreezing crisis.
2. Strategic Priorities
All seven districts focused their collaborative efforts on teaching quality
and student performance as core goals for reform and improvement. They
experimented with innovations such as:
* Union-led professional development
* New systems of teacher evaluation
* Mentoring programs
* Peer-to-peer assistance
* Teaching academies
The parties also worked together analyzing student performance in order
to develop priorities, and then establish data-driven plans for improving
achievement. This approach parallels the way continuous quality
improvement programs operate in the private sector, where the distributed
knowledge of the workforce is focused through high levels of employee
engagement.88 As Sidney Rubinstein observed on the private sector, "we
have a convergence of two necessities: the kind of work environment which
will bring self-fulfillment converging with the kind of workplace that is
essential for long-term economic growth. How we manage the transition and
cope with the change is critical." 89
8 6 RICHARD WALTON, INNOVATING TO COMPETE: LESSONS FOR DIFFUSING AND
MANAGING CHANGE IN THE WORKPLACE (1987).
87 See generally RICHARD WALTON & ROBERT MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY
OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (Seymour E. Harris ed., 1966).
88 See generally WILLIAM EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF THE CRISIS 23-24 (1982);
BILL BRADLEY ET AL., PARTICIPATIVE SYSTEMS AT WORK: CREATING QUALITY AND
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, (Sidney P. Rubinstein ed. 1987); CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD,
supra note 13.
89 Rubinstein, supra note 14.
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In the public sector the equivalent convergence is meaningful work for
public sector employees that also ensures responsible stewardship of public
resources. In this sense, when public sector work is performed well, the
public interest is usually advanced.
3. Supportive System Infrastructure
These districts have all established a culture of collaboration that
promotes trust, values the leadership and organization local unions can
provide, and respects teacher professionalism. Governance and day-to-day
managerial responsibility are shared by teachers, local union representatives,
and principals at both the district and school levels. Joint union-management
structures for planning and decision making were created at all levels-the
district, school, and teaching. 90 Further, the local unions function as dense
networks facilitating collaboration across disciplines and articulation within
subjects. This collaboration also extends to school and district-level problem
solving where teachers are organized into teams at the grade and department
levels to use student performance data in directing improvement efforts. In
many cases more than twenty percent of the local union members are
involved in some form of collaborative school improvement effort.9 1 In this
way the union as an institution provides great value in organizing, guiding,
and implementing school reform.
4. Sustaining Factors
These districts have benefited from long-term leadership and the use of
internal labor markets. It is not uncommon in these cases for union
presidents and superintendents to have served in their positions for a decade
or more.92 This has provided both stability in the institutional partnership
between the district and the union, but also for individual partnerships to be
formed between the union and administrative leaders, resulting in an increase
in "social capital" building the trust necessary for effective collaboration.
Further, these districts have often used internal labor markets to fill
administrative positions rather than recruit from outside the district.
Superintendents will then have spent years in the district, some as teachers-
even former union leaders, and then as principals and central office
administrators. This gave them extensive experience with the dynamics of
90 Rubinstein & McCarthy, supra note 80.
91 I-d.
92 Id.
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the partnership and the culture of collaboration, as well as strong working
relationships with union counterparts before they moved into the top
management positions.
5. Value-Adding Unionism
In all of these school districts, the union participated in, or led,
innovation that spans three different forms of "capital" relevant to people in
organizations:
1. Human Capital-Teaching Skills/Capacity9 3
Local unions in these districts have helped to create highly effective
systems of teacher induction, helping new teachers to be successful through
extensive coaching and mentoring. They have also created innovative
professional development programs, teaching academies, as well as
mentoring and peer assistance, and review processes. These all support both
new and experienced teachers by strengthening instructional practice. Joint
performance evaluation serves as the basis for tenure decisions. In this way
the union has taken on the challenge and responsibility for teaching quality.
This also mitigates one form of harm that has been evident in various
challenges to public sector collective bargaining-the view that teacher
unions inappropriately shield under-performing teachers with students
suffering as a result. The importance of human capital in generating
improved educational outcomes is, of course, well established and reflected
in pay scales that reward additional investments by teachers in their own
education and development, as well as in-service days for professional
development.
2. Social Capital-Peer Collaboration94
Through the collaborative partnerships, local unions have helped
establish teams or committees that enable teachers to have an ongoing
dialogue with each other and with administrators around issues such as
curriculum development, K-12 subject articulation, cross-disciplinary
integration, instructional practice, and student performance data evaluation.
Through these forums, teachers create a dense network of relationships that
allow them to improve their teaching, support one another, strengthen the
93 Id.
94 Id.
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quality of the instructional program, and work together to identify areas of
student performance that need improvement and approaches to address these
needs. The value generated by these networks isn't limited to the formal
educational improvement efforts, but also shows up in an increase in what
Jody Hoffer Gittell terms "relational coordination," which represents the
performance gains in cases where peoples' work is interdependent.95 The
connection of social capital to educational outcomes has been documented in
prior research, 96 though the forthcoming research by Rubinstein and
McCarthy adds more precise mapping of social networks and a broader
framework incorporating the institutional role of the union. 97
3. Institutional Capital-Operational Decision Making98
With the goal of improving teaching quality and student achievement,
local unions and district administrators have shared governance and decision
making through district-wide improvement planning committees, school site-
based decision making, and leadership teams. They have also developed joint
union-management processes for textbook selection, technology planning,
and the hiring of both faculty and administrators. In this way, management is
seen not as a specific group or level of employees, but as a function in which
the union shares responsibility. Innovation and quality are the job of both
faculty and administration. Conceptualizing joint governance as "institutional
capital" is a new formulation that captures the formalization of social
networks into ongoing rules and structural arrangements.
6. The Union as a Value-Adding Network
These cases demonstrate that the local union can bring unique
capabilities to collaborative partnerships with administration. This includes
the ability to form dense networks of members focused on improving
teaching quality. These networks facilitate communication within and across
schools, aid in collaboration between teachers around a variety of subjects,
95 JODY HOFFER GITTELL, HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTHCARE: USING THE POWER OF
RELATIONSHIPS TO ACHIEVE QUALITY, EFFICIENCY AND RESILIENCE 25-26 (2009); JODY
HOFFER GITTELL, THE SOUTHWEST AIRLINES WAY: USING THE POWER OF RELATIONSHIPS
To ACHIEVE HIGH PERFORMANCE 42-43 (2009).
96 Fritz K. Pil & Carie Leana, Applying Organizational Research to Public School
Reform: The Effects of Teacher Human and Social Capital on Student Performance, 52
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1101, 1111-1119 (2009).
97 Rubinstein & McCarthy, supra note 80.
98 Id.
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and support the effective implementation of new policies and practices.
While many current policy reforms assume education is an individual
enterprise, focusing on individual teacher accountability and practices, this
research shows that education is a collective enterprise that can best be
improved through a reform of the system. Piecemeal changes will not result
in systemic improvement. Therefore, the reform of school systems must
necessarily be collaborative among professional educators, and the union can
serve as the backbone of the network of teachers central to that effort. This
conception of a union as a value-adding institution has been studied across a
range of industries in the private sector.99 It also reflects the model of a
union as a professional organizationloo and it is one where the union derives
power not through threats to withhold its labor, but through its capacity to
enable work.101
7. Factors that Sustain Union-Management Partnerships
As noted earlier, long-term leadership from both union and
administration were common characteristics of the seven cases we studied.
In addition, the use of internal labor markets for developing and promoting
top administrators allowed them to understand how a culture of collaboration
could foster school improvement, and build trust with their union
counterparts.
These districts all invested heavily in joint learning opportunities. This
meant sending teams of teachers and administrators together throughout the
country to gain knowledge about institutional partnering, joint problem
solving, planning, decisionmaking, teaming, and leadership. However, in
addition to learning together (human capital) these educational trips also
strengthened their relationships (social capital), a key ingredient in effective
collaboration.
Further, these districts also built support from their communities for their
collaborative partnerships, both directly and through their boards of
education. In cases where the boards have not been supportive of joint
innovation, the local unions were active in the election process-recruiting
and endorsing candidates who valued a collaborative process in their schools
and who sought to hire superintendents who shared that view of the district.
These locals saw no contradiction between school improvement and
engaging actively in the politics of school board elections because they
99 Rubinstein, supra note 14, at 582.
100 HECKSCHER, supra note 12, at 10.
101 CUTCHER-GERSHENFELD, supra note 13, at 138-41.
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understood the importance of hiring and developing managers who sought a
productive and collaborative relationship with them. Note that public sector
employees having influence over the election of public officials was
criticized in the Wellington and Winter article1 02 and more recently in
challenges to public sector collective bargaining. In this case, however, the
involvement is for the goal of advancing a public good-improved
educational outcomes. This contrasts sharply with the implicit assumption in
the criticisms, which is that teachers and other educational employees will
only use influence in school board election for narrow parochial reasons.
In some cases the partnership arrangements were written into the
collective bargaining contracts, or were memorandums of understanding that
laid out the parameters for shared planning and decisionmaking. In other
cases they were informal arrangements that had developed over time outside
of the formal bargaining process. In the cases where contract language
existed, the language was enabling rather than prescriptive so the
partnerships could address new issues as they arose and bring more people
into the collaborative process. Research from the private sector has shown
that overly prescriptive language can sometimes limit the scope and
effectiveness of collaboration.103
Finally, both the union and administration shared accountability for
teaching quality and student performance. The union clearly saw that its job
was not only to bargain for and represent its members in contract disputes
with management, but also to ensure and improve the quality of teaching and
education for students.
B. Policy Implications
Drawing on this framework and research we see several implications for
public policy in the educational context:
1. Institutional Support
Districts seeking to create collaborative partnerships between local
unions and the administration could be helped by learning networks that
would link them with districts that have substantial experience operating in
this way. These learning networks could benefit from a sharing of resources
102 Wellington & Winter, supra note 4, at 1107-25.
103 Saul A. Rubinstein, Partnerships of Steel? Forging High Involvement Work
Systems in the US Steel Industry: A View from the Local Unions, 12 ADVANCES IN INDUS.
AND LAB. REL. 115, 115-41 (2003).
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and experiences across districts. This support could come from state-level
institutions and national associations that would provide training, facilitation,
technical assistance, a bargaining framework, and multi-stakeholder
oversight. As was noted earlier, employment relationships have an inherent
risk of becoming entrenched in adversarial dynamics. The availability of
institutional support helps to mitigate that risk. An original motivation for
providing public employees with collective bargaining rights was to avoid
more disruptive dynamics, such as wildcat strikes-now the question is
whether additional institutional arrangements are needed to avoid stasis
around an adversarial model of collective bargaining. Interestingly, there is
the potential to use the platform of collective bargaining itself to formalize
joint commitments for advancing educational outcomes, with links to
workplace-level activities that take place "after the handshake."
2. Incentives to Create Value
States can provide waivers from policies now being mandated around
teacher evaluation for those districts that demonstrate robust collaborative
systems for mentoring and peer evaluation. This model has been adopted in
some states in the areas of workers' compensation and has long been a
proposal in the area of health and safety. By reducing the expenditure of
resources for monitoring firms that have demonstrated leadership, public
funds can be allocated in a more efficient way. Firms given dispensation
from mandates would have a responsibility to share innovative practices and
be open to benchmarking, which represents an additional check and balance
on the leading firms. This is an important example of limiting the role of
central government when more decentralized capabilities are sufficient.
Small incentive grants could also be offered. More controversial are
forms of teacher compensation that are linked to performance. These are
controversial for a number of reasons. Measures such as test scores are
incomplete and misleading as performance outcomes. They cause unintended
consequences from focusing more heavily on that which is measured, foster
competition instead of collaboration among teachers, fail to reward the
contribution of collaboration among teachers to student performance, and do
not deal with underlying assumptions that discretionary teacher effort
requires additional pay. At the same time, one of the compelling features of
the annual improvement factor in the auto industry was that the three percent
wage increases (over and above cost of living increases) came out of three
percent year-over-year productivity gains-not out of the consumer's pocket
book. What might comparable incentive structure look like in the public
sector?
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3. Mechanisms to Mitigate Harm
Mechanisms to mitigate harm rarely get explicit attention in public or
private sector labor relations, but systematic attention is called for since there
are public goods at risk. Mechanisms are needed to balance explicitly the
internal interests of union and management in assuring the workforce of fair
treatment with the external responsibility to society for advancing public
goods, such as the highest quality education possible. Similarly, mechanisms
are needed, on the one hand, to minimize harm due to collective action by the
union to advance its interests, and minimizing harm, on the other hand, due
to collective action by conservative politicians seeking to gain political
advantage vis-i-vis others who are supported by unions. In both cases, there
are public goods that are at risk. Most promising would be to extend Malin's
identification of the importance of a clearer public presence in the
interactions of labor and management. 104 This could include, for example,
preceding collective bargaining with public hearings and public surveys so
that these interests are more explicitly taken into account. It could also
include having public sector labor-management committees incorporating a
public comment period before implementing joint initiatives. Principles of
procedural justice would support these and other innovations where the
public genuinely perceives that there has been a legitimate chance for input
on risks to public goods and that these views have, in some ways, been taken
into account.
4. Diffusion of Innovation
The literature on the diffusion of innovation emphasizes the important
roles of channels105 and lateral connections that are not bound by
hierarchies.106 Taken together, this suggests that the diffusion of innovations
around school collaboration can be enhanced by establishing additional
channels, such as state-level or regional-level conferences that demonstrate
innovative approaches to school improvement or training initiatives to build
needed skills.10 7 Beyond the specific context of public education, a state-
104 Malin, supra note 25, 1370-72.
105 EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 197-201 (1962).
10 6 DAVID ANDREWS, THE IRG SOLUTION: HIERARCHICAL INCOMPETENCE AND How
TO OVERCOME IT 18-19 (1984).
107 BARRY BLUESTONE & THOMAS KOCHAN, TOWARD A NEw GRAND BARGAIN:
COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES TO LABOR-MANAGEMENT REFORM IN MASSACHiUSETrS 11
(2011).
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level mechanism for diffusion of innovation was offered in the Employment
Policy Research Network white paper by Lewin and co-authors, which
involved a three-step model:
o Current State Assessment: Assess relevant state-level evidence on
pay, benefits, process improvements, and other relevant factors.
o Summit Dialogue: Convene state-level "summit meetings" with
broad stakeholder representation.
o Process Improvements: Identify and implement process
improvements and other innovations to enhance the ability of labor and
management simultaneously to have constructive employment relations and
effective public services. 108
Moreover, these channels should not only happen at state or national
levels, but mechanisms for diffusion are needed that allow for distributed
engagement-lateral as well as top-down.
5. Research and Shared Learning
Scholars, practitioners, and policy makers can collaborate to evaluate
innovative experiments and policy innovations, diffuse research findings, and
drive transformation. As institutions of learning, schools represent a
particularly fruitful location for new forms of "crowd sourced" learning-
where teachers, administrators, para-professionals, students, parents and
others can voluntarily help track relevant interactions and outcomes. With
appropriate avenues for feedback, high levels of engagement are possible.
V. CONCLUSION
Public sector collective bargaining has, from the outset, represented a
contested terrain. Still, the speed and intensity of challenges to public sector
collective bargaining on the heels of the recent recession were a surprise to
many. Many of the challenges were anchored in inaccuracies or
misperceptions. For example, there is strong empirical evidence that
teachers, not the public, have absorbed the bulk of the cost of rising health
care costs, 109 that teachers have traded wage increases for pension
benefits, 10 and that overall public sector compensation is below that of
comparably educated private sector workers. 1 1 Nonetheless, the challenges
108 LEWIN, supra note 53, at 1-32.1-32 (2011).
109 Id. at 7.
110 Id. at 8.
Ill Id. at 5.
138
[Vol. 28:1 20131
FUTURE PROSPECTS ON A CONTESTED TERRAIN
revealed limited public awareness of joint union-management innovations in
public education, limited actual or perceived instances where unions were
seen as potentially placing public goods at risk (such as being overly
protective of underperforming teachers), and a lack of mechanisms to foster
systematically the diffusion of innovation. Moreover, the challenges
revealed a deeper need for labor, management, and communities to return to
first principles and consider more robust models of collective bargaining in
public education. The forces driving narrow self-interest on the parties are
strong and the institution needs to ensure checks and balances within which
the integrative and distributive aspects of these self-interests can be trusted to
operate.
In this paper we have sought to advance this process by returning to three
first principles; each of which represents a form of check and balance in
society. This includes public sector collective bargaining as both a
constitutional and a human right, the nature of professional work, and the
realities of supply and demand in labor markets. Any challenges to public
sector collective bargaining should first take into account these first
principles from which the checks and balances derive.
Then, building on the first principles, we utilized the three-tier
transformation framework from Kochan, Katz and McKersie112 to examine
the institutional requirements of creating value and mitigating harm. While
there is a well-established literature on how union and management can
create value at the workplace, collective bargaining, and strategic levels, the
actual ways in which this happens in the public sector reflect the particular
nature of this work and the degree to which value incorporates public goods.
Mitigating harm is a new contribution in this article, which has as an
analogue in the private sector formulation where wage gains derived from
productivity gains, rather than from higher costs to consumers. In the public
sector, we call for more systematic attention to ways to mitigate harm and
create value, as well as new ideas on how to signal that to the public. This
could include, for example, innovative ways to more fully represent the
public interest in the interactions of labor and management, as well as
making more clear the connections between the public interest and
professional work.
The framework is further developed with a close look at education
reform, building on seven case studies developed by Rubinstein and
McCarthy. 113 We see that there are leading examples on how public sector
education unions can work with management to create value and, in some
112 KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 45, at 11-21.
113 Rubinstein & McCarthy, supra note 80.
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respects, to mitigate harm. These are, unfortunately, what are termed
"islands of success" and broader diffusion is needed.
While our focus has been on the public sector, the importance of taking
into account public goods can also be applied to the private sector. There too
are public goods that range from classic externalities, such as environmental
impacts or the impact of layoffs on communities, to collective good issues,
such as multi-employer pension plans, to much broader considerations, such
as income inequality and fair treatment in society. Were attention to these
and other societal considerations more explicitly and more effectively
addressed by collective bargaining, it would be more clearly mitigating harm
and adding value-both of which are appropriately expected of our
institutions.
Ultimately, it will take a transformation of public sector (and private
sector) labor relations if these forms of interaction are to overcome the
current challenges and secure their role as robust societal institutions.
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Table 1: Public Sector Legislation in 1969, 1984, and 1996, for State
Employees, Police, Firefighters, Teachers, and Other Local Employees,
with Challenges in 2010-2011 - "Right-to-Representation" States 114
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114 Chart adapted from R.G. VALLETTA AND R.B. FREEMAN, The NBER
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR
WORKERS UNIONIZE, (Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988). 1996
data is based on the extension of these data by Kim Ruben, which included adding a
classification for right-to-work states. This appendix uses the categories of employees,
local police, local fire, local teachers and local municipal employees based on the six
point scale, but collapsed to four categories/columns here. The 20 10-1 lchallenges are
drawn from Martin Malin, The Legislative Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law: A
Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 149-165 (2012), with
additional updates by private correspondence with the author (including corrections of
the data for Illinois and Kentucky). Also helpful is: http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/labor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx.
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Key:
Black/Reverse Type: "Duty to Bargain" includes both an explicit and an
implied duty to bargain
Dark Grey/Reverse Type: "Meet and confer" includes meet and confer,
right to present proposals, and authorized (but not required) to bargain
Lighter Grey: "Barred" is for cases where Collective bargaining is
prohibited
Lightest Grey: "No Law" is the absence of governing legislation
S=State Employees; P=Local Police; F=Local Firefighters; T=Local
Teachers; O=Other Local Employees
Under 2010-11 challenges, Dark Grey/Reverse Type is used for instances
where public sector rights were substantially eroded and Light Grey were
there were less severe limits on the scope or bargaining process; "nc" with a
blank background is used where there were challenges, but no changes, and
"ch" is for challenges that are not yet resolved.
142
[Vol. 28:1 20131
FUTURE PROSPECTS ON A CONTESTED TERRAIN
Table 2: Public Sector Legislation in 1969, 1984, and 1996, for State
Employees, Police, Firefighters, Teachers, and Other Local Employees,
with Challenges in 2010-2011 - "Rig ht-to-Work" States 115
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Sector Collective Bargaining Law Data Set, in WHEN PUBLIC SECTOR WORKERS
UNIONIZE, (Richard B. Freeman and Casey Ichniowski eds., 1988). 1996 data is based on the
extension of these data by Kim Ruben, which included adding a classification for fight-to-work
states. This appendix uses the categories of employees, local police, local fire, local teachers
and local municipal employees based on the six point scale, but collapsed to four
categories/columns here. The 2010-11lchallenges are drawn from Martin Malin, The
Legislative Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elements, 27 A.B.A.
J. LAB. & EMIP. L. 149, 149-165 (2012), with additional updates by private correspondence
with the author (including corrections of the data for Illinois and Kentucky). Also helpfuil is:
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-researchlabor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx. Note
that Indiana is included in table 2 even though it just became a fight-to-work state. Though
Phoenix does have a municipal ordinance, the state of Arizona does not. Also helpful is
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/labor/collective-bargaining-legislation-database.aspx.
143
THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Key:
Black/Reverse Type: "Duty to Bargain" includes both an explicit and
an implied duty to bargain
Dark Grey/Reverse Type: "Meet and confer" includes meet and
confer, right to present proposals, and authorized (but not required) to
bargain
Lighter Grey: "Barred" is for cases where Collective bargaining is
prohibited
Lightest Grey: "No Law" is the absence of governing legislation
S=State Employees; P=Local Police; F=Local Firefighters; T=Local
Teachers; O=Other Local Employees
Under 2010-11 challenges, Dark Grey/Reverse Type is used for instances
where public sector rights were substantially eroded and Light Grey were
there were less severe limits on the scope or bargaining process; "nc" with a
blank background is used where there were challenges , but no changes, and
"ch" is for challenges that are not yet resolved.
* Note: The Nevada law restricted bargaining for doctors, lawyers, and
some supervisors.
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